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Abstract
In this paper we study the macroeconomic impact of a policy which changes the
redistributive properties of an unfunded pension system. Using an overlapping gener-
ations model with a closed economy and heterogenous agents, we show that a weaker
link between contributions and beneﬁts has an impact on the level of capital per capita
if and only if there are inequalities of length of life. Furthermore, this policy has pos-
itive implications for every agent of the economy if the system has a deﬁned-beneﬁt
structure. The tax rate and inequalities decrease, whereas the wealth of each agent
increases. However, with a deﬁned-contribution pension system, this policy has a neg-
ative impact on every macroeconomic variable except on the wealth of the poorest
agents.
Keywords: Inequality; Pension Systems; Redistribution; Capital
JEL Classiﬁcation: H55; E21
1 Introduction
Pension systems can be classiﬁed according to three dimensions (Feldstein and Liebman
(2002)). Firstly, they can adopt either a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) or a fully-funded struc-
ture1. The size of unfunded pension systems is large in most industrialized countries. For
∗I thank my supervisor A. d'Autume and three anonymous referees for their helpful comments, and
participants to the working-group GTMPE. I also thank F. Terrier for her precious help. This paper
has also been presented in a seminar at the university of Evry and at the 6th International Workshop on
Pension and Saving. All remaining errors are mine.
†106-112 Boulevard de l'hôpital 75 013 Paris. E-mail: Christophe.Hachon@malix.univ-paris1.fr
1In this paper we only consider PAYG pension systems. In a portofolio approach Dutta et al. (2000)
show that a mixed pension system is desirable because risks of funded and unfunded pension systems diﬀer.
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example, the payroll tax rate used to ﬁnance them ranges from 12.4% for the United-States
to 29.6% for Italy (Nyce and Schieber (2005, pp.236)).
Secondly, pension systems can have either a deﬁned-beneﬁt or a deﬁned-contribution
structure. A pension system has a deﬁned-beneﬁt structure if it is the tax rate which
adjusts itself to changes in the economic and demographic environment. Conversely, it
has a deﬁned-contribution organization if it is the replacement rate which adjusts itself.
Most countries have chosen a deﬁned-beneﬁt pension system (Nyce and Schieber (2005)).
However, because of the increase in life expectancy, the ﬁscal burden of this structure has
increased strongly. Consequently, some countries, such as Italy, have adopted a deﬁned-
contribution pension system2.
Thirdly, pension systems can be more Beveridgian or more Bismarkian. A pension
system is purely Beveridgian if every agent receives the same pension. Conversely, a pension
system is purely Bismarkian if pensions depend completely on the wages of agents. A
pension system is mixed if it has a Beveridgian and a Bismarkian component. The more a
pension system is Beveridgian, the higher intra-generational transfers are. Countries highly
diﬀer by this intra-generational component. France, Germany and Italy have a Bismarkian
structure. Canada, the Netherlands and New-Zeland are essentially Beveridgian. Finally,
Japan, the United-Kingdom and the United States have mixed pension systems (Sommacal
(2006), Casamatta et al. (2000)).
Theoretical literature has explored the impact on the economic activity of the size of
PAYG pension systems3 organized either with a Beveridgian or with a Bismarkian struc-
ture4. The usual result is that Bismarkian systems provide more incentives to accumulate
human and physical capital and then induce a higher growth rate than Beveridgian pension
systems. But in fact, pension systems are usually a combination of these two elements.
Only a few authors have studied the impacts of a change along the third axis mentioned
above5. However, it is a central issue given the wide dispersion of countries along this third
axis.
The main idea of this paper is that PAYG pension systems can adopt a structure
2In this paper we do not explain the switch from a deﬁned-beneﬁt to a deﬁned-contribution pension
system. A model with a representative agent and an increasing life expectancy would be more appropriate
for this study.
3See Belan and Pestieau (1998), Breyer and Straub (1993) or Homburg (1990) among others for the
analysis of the transition from unfunded pension systems towards fully-funded pension systems.
4See Docquier and Paddison (2003), or Casarico and Devillanova (2007). These results are questioned
notably by Groezen et al. (2007), Lambrecht et al. (2005) or Le Garrec (2005).
5Except Sommacal (2006) with an endogenous labor supply model with a deﬁned-contribution pension
system.
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which combines Bismarkian and Beveridgian components, and we study the impacts of a
policy which increases the Beveridgian component of pension systems. We show that these
eﬀects are diﬀerent depending on whether the pension system has a deﬁned-beneﬁt or a
deﬁned-contribution structure. Last but not least, the inequalities of length of life play an
important role in the qualitative and quantitative results of this paper.
There is a growing empirical literature which analyzes these inequalities. Mesrine (1999)
studies the inequalities of length of life according to socio-professional groups in France6.
The most striking feature of his paper is that a worker has a probability to die between 35
and 65 years old almost twice higher than that of an executive manager. Furthermore, their
life expectancy at 35 is 38 and 44 respectively. The same qualitative results are observed
in the United-States (Panis and Lillard (1995), Deaton and Paxson (2000)).
Finally, Robert-Bobbée and Cadot (2007) show that this inequality is also observed for
elderly people. For agents who are 86, the ones with highest education level can expect to
live 20% longer than the ones with lowest education level.
Only a few papers have explored the economic impacts of these health inequalities.
Mitchell and Zeldes (1996, pp.365) emphasized that these health inequalities have impli-
cations on the redistributive properties of pension systems but they do not provide any
empirical or analytical analysis. Drouhin (2001) showed with a small open economy that
a Bismarkian PAYG pension system induces transfers from agents with a short life ex-
pectancy to agents with a long life expectancy. His model is a ﬁrst step in order to study
the impacts of the inequalities of length of life but it uses only a Bismarkian structure
and there are no general equilibrium eﬀects in his model. The political economy literature
has recently become interested in the implications of the link between life expectancy and
wages7.
In this paper we study the macroeconomic impact of a policy which modiﬁes the redis-
tributive properties of an unfunded pension system8. In order to obtain clear qualitative
results for every macroeconomic variable we ﬁrst give an analytical resolution of our model.
6These inequalities also depend on other factors like sex or the geographical localization. For example,
in France the life expectancy of women is 84.1, whereas that of men is only 77.2 (INSEE, 2006). Moreover,
Rican and Salem (1999) show that there are strong disparities according to the localization of people in
France.
7Borck (2007) shows that the size of a pension system can be determined by a coalition of elderly, very
poor and very rich agents. Poor agents beneﬁt from the Beveridgian part of the pension system, whereas
rich agents beneﬁt the longest time from the pension system.
8In this paper the term "redistributivity" means that we change the Bismarkian structure of pension
systems. A decrease in the redistributivity means that there is a stronger link between wages and pensions
per unit of time.
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Then, because the impact is ambiguous for some variables, we calibrate our model on French
data and we numerically solve our model. We work on French data because the French
pension system is highly Bismarkian (Casamatta et al. (2000)) and because the eﬃciency
of such a system is widely questioned. However, we also show that our numerical results
do not depend on this speciﬁc case. Using an overlapping generations model with a closed
economy and heterogenous agents, we show that a weaker link between contributions and
beneﬁts has an impact on the level of capital per capita if and only if there are inequalities
of length of life. We also show that this redistributive policy has positive implications for
every agent of the economy if the system has a deﬁned-beneﬁt structure. The tax rate and
inequalities decrease, whereas the wealth of each agent increases. However, with a deﬁned-
contribution pension system, this policy has a negative impact on every macroeconomic
variable except on the wealth of the poorest agents.
Gorski et al. (2007) also emphasized the role of the mortality diﬀerential to analyze
the impact on educational choices of a change towards a more Beveridgian pension system.
They ﬁnd that this impact is positive. In this paper, we analyze the impact of this policy
on physical capital accumulation.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main elements of our model.
In section 3 we detail the dynamic of the economy and its properties. The implications
in terms of utility and inequalities are studied in section 4. In section 5 we calibrate and
solve our model. Finally, section 6 includes some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
At each period t, it is assumed that two generations overlap: the young and the old. Their
respective size are Nt and Nt−1. The population grows at a constant rate n, such that
Nt = (1 + n)Nt−1. Each member of one generation receives at the beginning of his life a
productivity endowment a. This productivity takes its values in the interval Ωa = [a−, a+].
The density function and the cumulative distribution function of a are denoted by f(a)
and F (a) respectively. These functions are such that:
∫
Ωa
f(a)da = 1, F (a−) = 0 and
F (a+) = 1. Furthermore, a¯ denotes the average productivity of the economy:
a¯ =
∫
Ωa
af(a)da (1)
The density function f(a) is assumed to be independent of time and of the level of
capital.
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Each agent lives completely his ﬁrst period of life9 but only a fraction T (a) of his second
period of life10. We assume that T ′(a) > 0. The higher the productivity is, the longer the
length of life is. In doing so we assume that the length of life depends positively on the
productivity level of each agent. In our model, the wage level is an increasing function of
the productivity level. Consequently, the assumption on T (a) uses the empirical evidence
that the wage level is a signiﬁcant variable to explain the mortality diﬀerential between
agents (Adams et al. (2003))11. Borck (2007) uses the same assumption in a political
economy framework.
The average length of life is denoted by T¯ and is determined by:
T¯ =
∫
Ωa
T (a)f(a)da (2)
The link between productivity and length of life is measured by the covariance:
COVT (a),a =
∫
Ωa
T (a)af(a)da− T¯ a¯ (3)
This covariance is positive because of our assumption on the sign of T ′(a) > 0 (See
appendix E). The stronger the link between T (a) and a is, the bigger this covariance is.
Conversely, if T ′(a) = 0, i.e. if the length of life is the same for every agent, then this
covariance is null.
2.1 Consumers
The utility of consumers depends on their consumption ﬂows of their two periods of life.
For an agent born in period t endowed with a productivity level a, ct(a) and dt+1(a)/T (a)
denote the ﬁrst period and the second period consumption ﬂows respectively. Their utility
function is intertemporally separable and has the following form12:
Ut(a) = u(ct(a)) + βT (a)u
(
dt+1(a)
T (a)
)
(4)
where β represents the pure time preference factor for the present, and the T (a) in
front of their second period utility implies that the longer the length of life is, the more
9The length of each period is normalized to 1.
10There is no uncertainty in this economy to simplify our model. However our model can also be
interpreted as a model with uncertain lifetime. In that case T (a) is the probability that an agent survives
at the end of his ﬁrst period of life as in Drouhin (2001). It also implies that there exists a perfect annuity
market for each group of agents.
11See also Mesrine (1999), Pannis and Lillard (1995), or Deaton and Paxson (2000).
12It implies that the marginal rate of substitution between ct and dt+1 depends on the length of life.
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consumers value their utility of this period13.
Each agent oﬀers inelastically his work during his ﬁrst period of life and obtains a wage
w(a)14. This wage is taxed at a rate τ , and the revenues of this tax are used to ﬁnance
a PAYG pension system. When an agent becomes old he receives a pension p(a). For an
agent born in period t, his budget constraints are:
ct(a) = wt(a)(1− τ)− St(a) (5)
dt+1(a) = Rt+1St(a) + pt+1(a) (6)
with Rt+1 the interest factor and St(a) the saving function.
We also assume that the utility function has the following form : u(x) = ln(x). It
simpliﬁes the analytical expressions15. Using all these assumptions, the saving function is
the following:
St(a) =
βT (a)wt(a)(1− τ)
(1 + βT (a))
− pt+1(a)
(1 + βT (a))Rt+1
(7)
2.2 Firms
We assume a perfect competition on the ﬁnal good market and on the inputs markets. The
production function of ﬁrms is16:
Yt = AKαt
(
Nt
∫
Ωa
af(a)da
)1−α
(8)
with 0 < α < 1, Kt the physical capital level, and A > 0 the level of the technology.
As there is perfect competition on each market, ﬁrms take wages and interest factors as
given. Proﬁt maximisation implies the following expressions for prices given that the ﬁnal
good is the numéraire:
Rt = AαKα−1t
(∫
Ωa
af(a)Ntda
)1−α
≡ Aαkα−1t a¯1−α (9)
wt = A(1− α)Kαt
(∫
Ωa
af(a)Ntda
)−α
≡ A(1− α)k
α
t
a¯α
(10)
13In this paper we do not represent fertility choices even if life expectancy inequalities and wage inequal-
ities have an impact on these choices.
14In doing so we do not model the burden of income taxation on labor supply.
15It notably simpliﬁes the conditions that will be obtained and the aggregation of the saving functions.
Our qualitative results do not depend on this assumption.
16Our results do not depend on the form of the production function but it clariﬁes our analysis with
simple analytical results.
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with kt ≡ Kt/Nt, the capital level per young agent. wt is the wage per eﬃciency unit
of work. For agents with a productivity level a, their wage is:
wt(a) = wta = A(1− α)k
α
t
a¯α
a (11)
It implies that relative wages are independent of the level of capital, whereas absolute
diﬀerences of wages depend on it.
In the rest of this paper, w¯t will denote the average wage of the economy at period t.
It has the following expression:
w¯t =
∫
Ωa
wt(a)f(a)da = A(1− α)kαt a¯1−α (12)
2.3 The Pension System
We assume a PAYG pension system. The revenues of this system come from a proportional
tax on wages : τ . It is used to provide a pension for elderly people. Their pension depends
on the wages of young agents having the same productivity as theirs, and on the average
wage of the economy. Their respective weighting is λ and (1 − λ). The ﬁrst part of
this pension represents the Bismarkian component, whereas the second part represents
the Beveridgian component of this system (Casamatta et al. (2000)). λ measures the
indexation of pensions on activity wages of agents. The smaller λ is, the more this
pension system is redistributive.17.
Consumers receive only a fraction ν (with 0 < ν ≤ 1) of this weighted average, and
only during their second period of life T (a). ν denotes the average replacement rate of the
pension system. The pension of an agent endowed with a productivity level a is:
pt+1(a) = ν (λwt+1(a) + (1− λ)w¯t+1)T (a) (13)
With equations (11) and (12) we obtain:
pt+1(a) = νA(1− α)
kαt+1
a¯α
(λa+ (1− λ)a¯)T (a) (14)
We also assume that the government does not use debt. It implies that for every period
we have: ∫
Ωa
τwt+1(a)f(a)Nt+1da =
∫
Ωa
pt+1(a)f(a)Ntda (15)
17In this paper the term "redistributivity" only concerns the direct redistribution of pension systems
and not the eﬀective redistribution of pension systems. The eﬀective redistribution, which is the diﬀerence
between tax paid and amount received, can be very diﬀerent because of life expectancy inequalities.
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We show in appendix A that we obtain the following expression:
τ =
ν
1 + n
(
λ
COVT (a),a
a¯
+ T¯
)
(16)
It deﬁnes the tax rate in function of the parameters of the model. We say that it
characterizes a deﬁned-beneﬁt organization.
Proposition 1 : With a deﬁned-beneﬁt PAYG pension system τ is an increasing func-
tion of λ18 if and only if COVT (a),a > 0, i.e. if there are inequalities of length of life.
This result is very intuitive. Indeed, the richer agents are, the longer their length of
life is. Therefore, an increase in λ (i.e. a decrease in the redistributivity of the pension
system) increases the indexation of pensions on their wages. It implies that the pension
of rich agents increases. Moreover, they beneﬁt from these pensions for a longer period
of time than other agents. Consequently, the tax rate has to increase to ﬁnance these
additional expenditures.
We have to note that this result depends only on the budget constraint of the govern-
ment and not on the preferences of consumers.
Let us now assume that we have a deﬁned-contribution PAYG pension system (τ is
exogenous). It is the replacement rate ν which adjusts itself in order to maintain the
government budget constraint at equilibrium:
ν =
τ(1 + n)(
λ
COVT (a),a
a¯ + T¯
) (17)
Proposition 1 (bis): With a deﬁned-contribution PAYG pension system, the replace-
ment rate (ν) is a decreasing function of λ if and only if COVT (a),a > 0.
The intuition is the same as before. A smaller indexation on wages (a smaller λ) ben-
eﬁts to poor agents who live for a shorter period of time than rich ones. Then, for a given
replacement rate, expenditures are lower. Finally, government can increase the replace-
ment rate for every agent.
Corollary 1: With a deﬁned-beneﬁt (deﬁned-contribution) PAYG pension system, the
tax rate (replacement rate) is independent of the redistributivity of the pension system if
18This proposition can partly explain why Bismarkian pension systems are bigger than Beveridgian ones.
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and only if there are not any inequalities of length of life.
Without inequalities of length of life a variation in λ does not aﬀect the total amount
of pensions which are paid.
3 The Dynamic and its Properties
The dynamic of this economy is represented through the equation of capital accumulation.
Furthermore, because the marginal return of capital in the production function is decreas-
ing, the economy converges towards a steady state equilibrium such that the capital level
per worker is constant. The dynamic is the following:
Kt+1 =
∫
Ωa
St(a)f(a)Ntda (18)
It is straightforward to show that we ﬁnally obtain:
kt+1
[
1 + n+ ν
1− α
α
∫
Ωa
λaa¯ + (1− λ)
1 + βT (a)
T (a)f(a)da
]
=
βA(1− α)(1− τ)kαt
a¯α
∫
Ωa
T (a)a
1 + βT (a)
f(a)da (19)
The right-hand-side of this equation is a strictly concave function of kt. Consequently,
there is a unique non-trivial steady state which has the following form:
(k∗)1−α =
βA(1−α)(1−τ)
a¯α
∫
Ωa
T (a)a
1+βT (a)f(a)da
1 + n+ ν 1−αα
∫
Ωa
λa
a¯
+(1−λ)
1+βT (a) T (a)f(a)da
(20)
Proposition 2: With a deﬁned-beneﬁt PAYG pension system, a decrease in λ has a
positive impact on k∗.
Proof : The numerator of equation (20) is a decreasing function of λ because only
τ depends positively on λ. Moreover, we know that T (a)/(1 + βT (a)) is an increasing
function of a. It implies that T (a)/(1 + βT (a)) < T (a¯)/(1 + βT (a¯)) (>), ∀a < a¯ (>).
Then, (a − a¯)T (a)/(1 + βT (a)) > T (a¯)/(1 + βT (a¯))(a − a¯), ∀a. The denominator is an
increasing function of λ if the following condition is satisﬁed :
∫
Ωa
a−a¯
1+βT (a)T (a)f(a)da ≥ 0.
We know that a−a¯1+βT (a)T (a)f(a) ≥ a−a¯1+βT (a¯)T (a¯)f(a), ∀a ∈ Ωa. Integrating the two sides
of this equation on the interval Ωa, the right-hand-side is equal to zero and the condition
9
mentioned above is satisﬁed.2
Two kinds of eﬀects play a role when we analyse the eﬀects of a decrease in λ. The for-
mer concerns the impact on the tax rate. Indeed, we have showed in proposition 1 that the
tax rate is an increasing function of λ. If λ falls, the tax rate decreases for every consumer,
which has a positive eﬀect on saving without ambiguity. The latter concerns the impact
on the pension received by each agent. If λ decreases, consumers with a productivity lower
than a¯ receive a greater pension, whereas consumers with a productivity higher than a¯
receive a smaller pension. The ﬁrst group of agents saves less and the second one saves
more. Proposition (2) shows that the net eﬀect on saving is positive. Indeed, agents for
whom the pension decreases have a longer length of life than the others. Consequently, the
increase in the saving of rich agents overcompensates the decrease in the saving of poor
agents.
Proposition 2 (bis): With a deﬁned-contribution PAYG pension system, a decrease
in λ has a positive impact on k∗ if and only if:
∫
Ωa
1
1+βT (a)T (a)f(a)da∫
Ωa
T (a)f(a)da
≤
∫
Ωa
a−a¯
1+βT (a)T (a)f(a)da∫
Ωa
(a− a¯)T (a)f(a)da (21)
Proof : τ is ﬁxed because it is a deﬁned-contribution pension system. It is ν which
adjusts itself and only the last term of the denominator depends on λ. The condition
ensures that the derivative of this term with respect to λ is positive.2
In a deﬁned-contribution PAYG pension system, we have showed in proposition 1 (bis)
that ν is a decreasing function of λ. Then, following an increase in the redistributivity of
the pension system (a decrease in λ), the government increases the replacement rate. It
has a positive impact on the pension of every consumer ceteris paribus, and thus a negative
eﬀect on saving. But the decrease in λ has a positive (negative) impact on the saving of
agents endowed with a productivity higher (smaller) than a¯. The condition of the propo-
sition ensures that the positive eﬀect is higher than the two negative ones.
Proposition 3: (i) If there are no inequalities of length of life then k∗ does not depend
on λ. (ii) This result remains true for every homothetic preference.
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Proof : See appendix B.2
We have showed with proposition 1 and 1 (bis) that if T (a) = T for all a, then the
tax rate (replacement rate) is independent of λ. The only eﬀects concern the increase in
the saving of agents endowed with a productivity higher than a¯, and the decrease in the
saving of agents endowed with a productivity lower than a¯. These last two eﬀects exactly
compensate.
4 Wealth, Consumption and Redistribution
This section has two main objectives. The ﬁrst one is to study the evolution of the wealth, of
the consumption and of the utility of an agent if the degree of redistribution of the pension
system increases (λ decreases). The second one is to study the evolution of inequalities of
consumption and of welfare if λ decreases.
These analytical results are obtained at steady state to simplify the exposition. Every
derivative is thus a comparison between steady states.
4.1 Wealth, Welfare and Redistribution
The wealth of an agent born in period t endowed with a productivity level a, has the
following form:
Wt(a) = wt(a)(1− τ) + pt+1(a)
Rt+1
(22)
We want to know if the wealth of each consumer increases when the redistribution of
the pension system is higher (λ decreases).
Proposition 4: With a deﬁned-beneﬁt pension system, if λ decreases then the wealth
of agents endowed with a productivity smaller than a¯ increases, whereas the impact on the
wealth of other agents is ambiguous. The net eﬀect is positive for every agent if19:
−
dk
dλ
k
≥
a+
a¯ − 1
λa+a¯ + 1− λ
(23)
Proof : See appendix C.2
Proposition 1 has showed that the tax rate is an increasing function of λ. Furthermore,
we have showed with proposition 2 that k∗ is a decreasing function of λ. Then the net
19It is a suﬃcient condition.
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wage of the ﬁrst period of life is higher when the redistributivity of the pension system
increases. More generally, wages per eﬃciency unit of work increase.
Moreover, a decrease in λ reduces the indexation of pensions on wages. Consequently,
it has a positive impact on the pensions of agents endowed with a productivity smaller
than a¯ and a negative eﬀect on pensions of agents endowed with a productivity higher
than a¯. The condition in the proposition ensures that for rich agents (a > a¯) all positive
eﬀects overcompensate the decrease in the indexation of pensions on wages.
Proposition 4 (bis): With a deﬁned-contribution pension system, if λ decreases then:
• If the condition of proposition 2 (bis) is true then the wealth of agents endowed with
a productivity smaller than a¯ increases, whereas the impact on the wealth of other
agents is ambiguous. The net eﬀect is positive for every agent if20:
−ν
dk
dλ + k
dν
dλ
k
≥
a+
a¯ − 1
λa+a¯ + 1− λ
(24)
• Otherwise, the net impact is ambiguous for every consumer.
Proof : See appendix C.2
If the condition of proposition 2 (bis) is true then a decrease in λ has a positive im-
pact on k∗. Furthermore, it aﬀects the pension of agents diﬀerently depending on whether
consumers have a productivity higher or lower than a¯. The eﬀects are the same as before
except that τ is ﬁxed exogenously. Every agent beneﬁts from the increase in ν and more
particulary agents with a long life expectancy. That is why the condition is less restrictive
than that of proposition 4. Nevertheless, if the eﬀect on k∗ is negative then the impact on
the wealth is ambiguous for every consumer.
The utility of an agent depends on the level of consumption of the two periods of his
life. Using the budget constraints of consumers we obtain:
ct(a) =
Wt(a)
1 + βT (a)
(25)
and
dt+1(a) = βT (a)Rt+1
Wt(a)
1 + βT (a)
(26)
20It is a suﬃcient condition.
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The consumption level of his ﬁrst period of life depends on λ only through the wealth
level, whereas the consumption level of his second period of life depends on the wealth level
and on the interest factor. The utility level is an increasing function of the redistributivity
of the pension system if and only if:
−(1 + βT (a))dW (a)/dλ
W (a)
> −(1− α)βT (a)dk/dλ
k
(27)
The left-hand-side represents the evolution of the wealth of an agent and the right-
hand-side the evolution of the interest factor. Indeed, a change in λ aﬀects k∗ and thus the
interest factor. Let us consider the case of a deﬁned-beneﬁt pension system. A decrease
in λ has a positive impact on the wealth of every consumer (dW (a)/dλ < 0). But at
the same time it reduces the interest factor (dk∗/dλ < 0). The net eﬀect on utility is
thus ambiguous. More precisely, the net eﬀect can be negative for agents with a long life
expectancy because they save a large part of their wealth and are strongly aﬀected by the
decrease in the interest factor.
4.2 Inequalities and Redistribution
To study inequalities, two groups of agents are used: the poorest endowed with a produc-
tivity level a− and the richest endowed with a productivity level a+21. The main objective
is to study welfare inequalities, but the relative inequalities of wealth have to be studied
ﬁrst.
Proposition 5: With a deﬁned-beneﬁt pension system, the relative inequality of wealth
W (a−)/W (a+) is an increasing function of the redistributivity of the pension system (a
decrease in λ) if22:
T (a−)
a−
≥ T (a+)
a+
(28)
Proof : See appendix D.2
The direct impact of a decrease in λ is to reduce the pensions of rich agents (a > a¯) and
to increase these of poor agents (a < a¯). It increases the ratioW (a−)/W (a+). Moreover, a
decrease in λ has a positive eﬀect on net wages because of its positive impact on capital per
capita and because of its negative impact on the tax rate. This eﬀect beneﬁts essentially
to the richest. Finally, a decrease in λ has a positive impact on wt/Rt. The richest are
21We do not use here the Gini coeﬃcient for analytical convenience. See section 5 for an estimation of
the Gini coeﬃcient in our model.
22It is a suﬃcient condition
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the ones who essentially beneﬁt from this eﬀect because they live for a longer period of
time. The condition of the proposition ensures that the redistributive eﬀect dominates
every other.
Proposition 5 (bis): With a deﬁned-contribution pension system, if the condition
of proposition 2 (bis) is true then the relative inequality of wealth W (a−)/W (a+) is an
increasing function of the redistributivity of the pension system (a decrease in λ) if23 :
T (a−)
a−
>
T (a+)
a+
× λ
a+
a¯ + 1− λ
λa−a¯ + 1− λ
(29)
Proof : See appendix D.2
The interpretation is the same as before except that τ is ﬁxed exogenously and that
λ has a negative impact on ν. The increase in the replacement rate beneﬁts essentially
to agents with a long length of life, i.e. to rich agents. Condition (29) is therefore more
restrictive than condition (28) and cannot be true for a λ which tends towards 1.
The study of welfare inequalities can now be done. These inequalities can be measured
as the diﬀerence between the utility of the richest (U(a+)) and the utility of the poorest
(U(a−)). Analytically it has the following form:
U(a+)− U(a−) = (1 + βT (a+)) ln(W (a+))− (1 + βT (a−)) ln(W (a−))+
β(T (a+)− T (a−))(α− 1) ln(k) + cste (30)
If the redistributivity of the pension system increases (λ decreases), the previous dif-
ferential decreases if and only if:
−(1+βT (a+))dW (a+)/dλ
W (a+)
−β(T (a+)−T (a−))(α−1)dk/dλ
k
< −(1+βT (a−))dW (a−)/dλ
W (a−)
(31)
This equation is useful because it details the diﬀerent channels through which the
redistributivity has an impact on the utility diﬀerential. Let us study the case of a deﬁned-
beneﬁt pension system. First, let us assume that the condition of proposition 5 is true.
Then we have showed that the wealth ratio (W (a−)/W (a+)) is an increasing function of
the redistributivity of the pension system, i.e.:
−dW (a+)/dλ
W (a+)
< −dW (a−)/dλ
W (a−)
(32)
23It is a suﬃcient condition
14
Condition (31) is more restrictive if, for the moment, we neglect the impact on the
interest rate. Indeed, the richest can beneﬁt from their wealth for a longer period of time.
Then the decrease in the wealth inequalities does not necessarily imply a decrease in the
utility diﬀerential. Nevertheless, the left-hand-side also shows that the decrease in the
interest rate aﬀects more strongly the richest who save more because of their high length
of life. This last eﬀect reduces the utility diﬀerential.
5 Calibration and Results
We choose to calibrate our model on French data because the French pension system is
clearly Bismarkian. As it will be mentioned later, Hairault and Langot (2008) ﬁnd that
λ in the French pension system is 0.885. Then we can consider the opportunity to switch
towards a more Beveridgian pension system.
The availability of data thanks to the study of Hairault and Langot (2008) is also a
main factor which has inﬂuenced our choice to consider the French case24.
First of all we have to deﬁne an interval for the set Ωa. We assume that it is: Ωa =
[0.08, 1]. The ratio a+/a− is 12.5. It implies that the wage inequality ratio between the
poorest and the richest is 12.5. Piketty (2002), studying the distribution of wages in France,
ﬁnds a ratio of 5 between the wages of the ﬁrst and of the last decile. The gap between
this empirical fact and our calibration can be explained by the fact that we use the two
extreme values of a continuum and as a consequence wage inequalities are greater. We
could even say that it underestimates the reality. We choose this interval for Ωa because
once it is combined with the density function of a, our model matches the Gini coeﬃcient
of the wage distribution calculated by Hairault and Langot (2008) on French data.
The density function of productivity levels (f(a)) has to respect the essential property:
mode<median<mean (Lambert (2001, pp.23)). This property is a common feature of
most industrialized countries. It implies that the wage distribution among the population
is asymetric. The most common income level is less than the median wage. And because
of strong wage inequalities the median wage is less than the average wage of the economy.
f(a) = b − ca, with b, c ∈ R is the simplest way to represent it. b and c have to be
ﬁxed such that: f(a) > 0, ∀a and ∫Ωa f(a)da = 1. Furthermore the Gini index has to tend
towards 0.32 in order to match the estimation on French data used in Hairault and Langot
(2008).
Lambert (2001) shows that the Gini index can be calculated as:
24Appendix G sums up our calibration and the main statistics.
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G = −1 + 2
∫ a+
a−
aF (a)f(a)
a¯
da (33)
The following density function respects these properties:
f(a) = 2.1129− 1.9a (34)
Moreover we can check that the mean is higher than the median because
∫ a¯
a− f(a)da >
0.5.
The second important function that we have to specify is T (a). To simplify and because
of the lack of information we assume that this function has the form: T (a) = a. We obtain
that T¯ = 0.4167 and that COVT (a),a = 0.05533. It implies that the average length of life of
the population is 77 years old. It is slightly lower than the average life expectancy observed
in France which is 80 years old (World Bank)25.
The initial value of λ is ﬁxed at 0.885. It is the estimation obtained by Hairault
and Langot (2008) on French data. It implies that the French pension system is highly
Bismarkian. The growth rate of the population is n = 0.3. It corresponds to an annual
growth rate of the population of 0.65% calculated by Charpin (1999) on French data. The
technology parameter A is normalized to 1.
Finally, the last two parameters are common to a wide economic literature which uses
calibration to solve overlapping-generations models. The length of each period is 40 years.
The elasticity of the production function with respect to capital is α = 0.33. It also rep-
resents the share of capital in total output. The pure time preference factor is β = 0.6
(d'Autume (2003)), i.e. an annual psychologic discount rate of 1.3%.
We analyse the eﬀects of a decrease in λ, i.e. an increase in the Beveridgian part of
the pension system26. We distinguish between the long term eﬀects and the transitional
dynamic for deﬁned-beneﬁt and for deﬁned-contribution pension systems.
5.1 The Long Term Eﬀects
With a deﬁned-beneﬁt pension system it is the tax rate which adjusts itself and the average
replacement rate (ν) is ﬁxed at 0.757 which is the value obtained by Hairault and Langot
25Appendix F shows that it has no impact on our qualitative results.
26Appendix F provides a sensitivity analysis.
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∆λ = −11.3% Deﬁned-Beneﬁt Deﬁned-Contribution
∆τa -2.5% -
∆ν - +2.55%
∆k∗ +2.7% -0.15%
∆W (a+) +1.14% -0.55%
∆W (a−) +2.68% +.053%
∆RIW b +1.53% +1.08%
∆GDPpcc +0.88% -0.05%
∆dUtild -1.18% -0.85%
IGbe 0.3383 0.3351
IGa 0.3364 0.3338
aHere we report a change in % and not in %pts.
bRIW = W (a−)/W (a+).
cGDPpc means GDP per capita.
ddUtil = U(a+)− U(a−).
eIGb (IGa) denotes the Gini coeﬃcient before (after) the change in λ.
Table 1: Macroeconomic impact of a more redistributive pension system
(2008) on French data. The annual interest rate obtained is approximately 4.4%27.
Qualitatively, we observe the expected results. Indeed an increase in the redistributivity
of the pension system (a decrease in λ) has a negative impact on the tax rate, and a positive
one on the steady state capital per worker, on the GDP per capita and on the wealth level.
Welfare inequalities decrease.
Quantitatively, diminishing arbitrarily λ from 0.885 to 0.785, i.e. a decrease of 11.3%,
we ﬁnd a decrease in the tax rate of 2.49%. The steady state level of capital per worker
and the GDP per capita increase of 2.7% and of 0.88% respectively. Welfare inequalities
decrease of 1.18%. Finally, the Gini coeﬃcient of wealth28 decreases which means that
wealth inequalities decrease. Table (1) sums up the main results.
We now study the case of a deﬁned-contribution pension system. The tax rate is ﬁxed
exogenously at 0.23. It is the value calculated by Hairault and Langot (2008), and it is
27The annual interest rate is obtained by R1/40 − 1, with R the interest factor obtained using equation
(9).
28Using the same methodology as for the distribution of wages, the Gini coeﬃcient of Wealth is obtained
using the formula of Lambert (2001, pp.33) : G = −1 + 2
∫ a+
a−
W (a)F (a)f(a)
W (a)
da.
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near the tax rate reported by Nyce and Schieber (2005). We also study the impact of an
arbitrarily decrease in λ. The annual interest rate is approximately 3.9%.
Qualitatively the results show an increase in the replacement rate. Furthermore, the
net eﬀect on saving is negative since the steady state capital per young decreases. This
last eﬀect implies a decrease in the wealth of the richest, whereas the net eﬀect remains
positive for the poorest because of the redistributive eﬀect.
Quantitatively, diminishing λ of 11.3% (from 0.885 to 0.785), we ﬁnd an increase in
the replacement rate of 2.55%. The steady state level of capital per young and the GDP
per capita decrease of 0.15% and of 0.05% respectively. The utility inequalities decrease
of 0.85%. As before we also observe a decrease in the Gini coeﬃcient of wealth, i.e. a
decrease in wealth inequalities. Table (1) sums up the main results.
Two conclusions can right now be stressed: (i) the net impact is greater for a deﬁned-
beneﬁt pension system than for a deﬁned-contribution pension system because in the ﬁrst
case every eﬀect has the same sign. (ii) For a deﬁned-contribution pension system the only
positive impact of the redistributivity is to reduce inequalities.
5.2 The Transitory Dynamic
The main objective of this part is to study the short term eﬀects of an unexpected decrease
in λ of 11.3%. We assume that the economy is initially at its steady state. λ is assumed
to remain constant during the ﬁrst two periods and then to decrease to 0.785. Agents
born in period 2 do not expect this change and thus do not adjust their saving. But, for
every following generation the assumption of perfect foresight implies that they exactly
adjust their saving in order to maximize their utility. Because of the unpredictability of
the change in λ, the capital per worker remains constant until period 3 and adjusts only
during the following periods.
With a deﬁned-beneﬁt pension system the tax rate becomes 0.31 from period 3 (0.3
initially). Agents born in period 1 are not aﬀected by this change and are used as a
reference. The capital per young adjusts progressively to its new steady state value. The
utility of the richest decreases substantially for agents born in period 2 because they do
not suﬃciently save for their second period of life. But the utility of the poorest increases
until it reaches a new steady state value which is higher.
Utility inequalities decrease strongly right the second generation and then stabilize
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themselves after a very small increase because of the adjustment of the saving of the rich-
est. Figures 1-4 sum up the main results.
For deﬁned-contribution pension systems the simulation is the same. Qualitative re-
sults show a quick adjustment of the variables towards their new steady state value. Only
the utility levels of the consumers born in period 2 describe a diﬀerent trajectory. The
utility of the richest and that of the poorest decrease and increase respectively. Figures
5-8 sum up the main results.
Remark : Qualitative and quantitative results are very diﬀerent according to the
nature of the pension system (deﬁned-beneﬁt or deﬁned-contribution). It has to be taken
into account in order to study the impact of a change in the redistributive properties of a
pension system.
6 Conclusion
The increase in the redistributivity of a deﬁned-beneﬁt pension system can : (i) decrease
the taxe rate of the pension system; (ii) increase the capital per capita; (iii) increase the
wealth and the welfare of every agent; (iv) reduce the inequalities of wealth and of welfare.
However, if the pension system has a deﬁned-contribution structure, then the only positive
eﬀect is that it increases the wealth and the utility of the poorest agents.
Therefore, the knowledge of the nature of a pension system (deﬁned-beneﬁt or deﬁned-
contribution) and the taking into account of the life expectancy inequalities are both impor-
tant in order to determine the qualitative and quantitative impacts of a more redistributive
pension system.
The ﬁrst extension of this paper would be to introduce labor supply in order to take
into account the distorsive impact of our redistributive policy.
Another application of this paper would be to study the impact of redistributive poli-
cies on educational choices. In the case of a capital-skill complementarity, and given the
mechanism we described above, it is possible that a more redistributive pension system
implies that a larger share of the population decides to educate herself. Another extension
would be to clarify theoretically the debate on the inequalities of contribution to pension
systems. Indeed, the inequalities of length of life imply that pension systems are far less
progressive than they seem.
19
REFERENCES
Acemoglu, D., 2002. "Technical Change, Inequality, and the Labor Market". Journal
of Economic Literature, 40, 7-72.
Adams, P., Hurd, M.D., McFadden, D., Merrill, A., Ribeiro, T., 2003.
"Healthy, Wealthy and Wise ? Tests for Direct Causal Paths between Health and Socio-
Economic Status". Journal of Econometrics, 112, 3-56.
d'Autume, A., 2003. "Vieillissement et choix de l'âge de la retraite. Que peut nous
dire le modèle à générations ?". Revue Economique, 54 (3), 561-571.
Belan, P., Pestieau, P., 1998. "Privatizing Social Security: A Critical Assessment".
The Genova Papers on Risk and Insurance, 24(1), 114-130.
Borck, R., 2007. "On the Choice of Public Pensions when Income and Life Expectancy
are Correlated". Journal of Public Economic Theory, 9, 711-725.
Breyer, F., Straub, M., 1993. "Welfare eﬀects of unfunded pension systems when
labor supply is endogenous". Journal of Public Economics, 50(1), 77-91.
Casamatta, G., Cremer, H., Pestieau, P., 2000. "The political economy of social
security". Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 102, 503-522.
Casarico, A., Devillanova, C., 2007 (forthcoming). Capital Skill complementarity
and the Redistributive Eﬀects of Social Security Reforms. Journal of Public Economics,
doi:1016/j-jpubeco.2007.06.007.
Charpin, J.M., 1999. "L'avenir de nos retraites". La documentation française.
Deaton, A. and Paxson, C., 1999. "Mortality, education, Income, and Inequality
among American Cohorts". NBER Working Paper No. 7140.
Docquier, F., Paddison, O., 2003. "Social Security Beneﬁt Rules, Growth and
Inequality". Journal of Macroeconomics, 25, 47-71.
Drouhin, N., 2001. "Inégalités face à la mort et systèmes de retraite". Revue
d'Economie Politique.
Dutta, J., Kapur, S., Orszag, J.M., 2000. "A portfolio approach to the optimal
funding of pensions". Economics Letters, 69(2), 201-206.
Feldstein, M. and Liebman, J.B., 2002. "Social Security", in Handbook of Public
Economics, volume 4, Edited by Auerbach, A.J. and Feldstein, M..
Gorski, M., Krieger, T. and Lange, T., 2007. "Pensions, Education and Life
Expectancy". Working Paper.
Groezen, B.v., Meijdam, L., Verbon, H.A.A., 2007. "Increased Pension Savings:
Blessing or Curse ? Social Security Reform in a Two Sector Growth Model". Economica,
20
74(296), 736-755.
Hairault, J.O. and Langot, F., 2008. "Inequality and Social Security Reforms".
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 32 (2), 386-410.
Heer, B., Maussner, A., 2005. "Dynamic General Equilibrium Modelling: Compu-
tational Methods and Applications". Springer Berlin-Heidelberg.
Homburg, S., 1990. "The eﬃciency of unfunded pension schemes". Journal of Insti-
tutional and Theoretical Economics, 146, 640-649.
INSEE, 1999. "Revenu et patrimoine des ménages". 28.
Lambert, P.J., 2001. "The Distribution and Redistribution of Income". Manchester
University Press.
Lambrecht, S., Michel, P., Vidal, J-P, 2005. "Public Pensions and Growth".
European Economic Review, 49, 1261-1281.
Le Garrec, G., 2005. "Social Security, Inequality and Growth". OFCE, working paper
2005-22.
Mesrine, A., 1999. "Les diﬀérences de mortalité par milieu social restent fortes".
Données Sociales, INSEE, 228-235.
Mitchell, O.S. and Zeldes, S.P., 1996. "Social Security Privatization : A Structure
for Analysis". American Economic Review, 88 (2), 363-367.
Pannis, C. and Lillard, L., 1995. "Socioeconomic Diﬀerentials in the Returns to
Social Security". RAND Working Paper, Santa Monica, CA.
Piketty, T., 2002. "L'économie des Inégalités". Repères: La découverte.
Rican, S. and Salem, G., 1999. "Les disparités spatiales de mortalité des adultes en
âge d'activité". Données Sociales, INSEE, 236-242.
Monteil, C. and Robert-Bobée, I., 2005. "Les diﬀérences sociales de mortalité :
en augmentation chez les hommes, stables chez les femmes". INSEE première, No.1025.
Nyce, S.A. and Schieber, S.J., 2005. "The Economic Implications of Aging Soci-
eties: The Cost of Living Happily Ever After". Cambridge University Press.
Robert-Bobée, I. and Cadot, O., 2007. "Mortalité aux Grands Ages : encore des
écarts selon le diplôme et la catégorie sociale". INSEE première, No.1122.
Sommacal, A., 2006. "Pension systems and intragenerational redistribution when
labor supply is endogenous". Oxford Economic Papers, 58, 379-406.
APPENDIX
21
Appendix A
Computation of the expression of τ :
(1 + n)
∫
Ωa
τwt+1(a)f(a)da =
∫
Ωa
pt+1(a)f(a)da (35)
Furthermore, we know that:
pt+1(a) = νA(1− α)
kαt+1
a¯α
(λa+ (1− λ)a¯)T (a) (36)
Computing the right-hand-side we obtain the following expression:
RHS = νA(1− α)k
α
t+1
a¯α
(
λ
∫
Ωa
T (a)af(a)da+ (1− λ)a¯
∫
Ωa
T (a)f(a)da
)
(37)
Equation (3) implies:
∫
Ωa
T (a)af(a)da = COVT (a),a + a¯T¯ . The second part of the
expression between brackets is the average length of life. Finally we have:
RHS = νA(1− α)k
α
t+1
a¯α
(λCOVT (a),a + a¯T¯ ) (38)
We recognize in the left-hand-side the average wage:
∫
Ωa
wt+1(a)f(a)da. Then equal-
izing the left-hand-side and the right-hand-side we obtain equation (16).2
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(i) The study of equation (20) shows that τ and the denominator become independent
of λ if T (a) = a, ∀a.2
(ii) Let us consider the case of homothetic preferences which have the following form:
Ut(a) = U
(
ct(a),
dt+1(a)
T (a)
)
(39)
The intertemporal budget constraint of this agent is:
ct(a) +
dt+1(a)
Rt+1
= wt(a)(1− τ) + pt+1(a)
Rt+1
≡Wt(a) (40)
Given the preferences, the solution for consumers is:
ct(a) = ξ(T (a), Rt+1)Wt(a) (41)
And ﬁnally:
St(a) = wt(a)(1− τ)− ct(a) = ξ1(T (a), Rt+1)wt(a)− ξ2(T (a), Rt+1)pt+1(a)
Rt+1
(42)
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Therefore saving is a linear function of the wage and of the pension. Assuming that
the length of life is the same for every agent (T (a) = T , ∀a) then the capital market
equilibrium can be written:
(1 + n)kt+1 =
∫
Ωa
St(a)f(a)da (43)
or,
(1 + n)kt+1 = ξ1(T,Rt+1)w¯t − ξ2(T,Rt+1)νT w¯t+1
Rt+1
(44)
λ does not appear in this expression.2
Appendix C
Proof of proposition 4:
The derivative of equation (22) with respect to λ gives the following expression:
dWt(a)
dλ
=
aA
1− α
a¯α
(
αkα−1
dk
dλ
(1− τ)− dτ
dλ
kα
)
+ ν
1− α
α
T (a)
[(
λ
a
a¯
+ 1− λ
) dk
dλ
+ k(
a
a¯
− 1)
]
We know that dτ/dλ > 0 and that dk∗/dλ < 0. Finally, the previous expression is
negative if the second part of the equation is negative, i.e. if:
dk
dλ
k
≤ 1−
a
a¯
λaa¯ + 1− λ
However, as the right-hand-side is a decreasing function of a, then it is suﬃcient for
this inequality to be true for a = a+.
Remark: This inequality is always true for a < a¯.2
Proof of proposition 4 (bis):
The methodology is the same as before except that τ is ﬁxed exogenously and that ν
is a decreasing function of λ.2
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Proof of proposition 5:
Equation (22) can be written :
Wt(a) = A(1− α)k
α
t
a¯α
a(1− τ) + ν 1− α
α
kt+1
(
λ
a
a¯
+ (1− λ)
)
T (a) (45)
or, in the steady state:
Wt(a) = k
[
A(1− α)k
α−1
a¯α
a(1− τ) + ν 1− α
α
(
λ
a
a¯
+ (1− λ)
)
T (a)
]
(46)
With equation (20), the left-hand-side between brackets can be written:
a
1 + n+ ν 1−αα
∫
Ωa
λa
a¯
+(1−λ)
1+βT (a) T (a)f(a)da
β
∫
Ωa
T (a)a
1+βT (a)f(a)da
≡ af(λ)
Equation (46) becomes:
Wt(a) = k
[
af(λ) + ν
1− α
α
(
λ
a
a¯
+ (1− λ)
)
T (a)
]
(47)
The relative wealth inequalities can be written:
Wt(a−)
Wt(a+)
=
a−f(λ) + ν 1−αα
(
λa−a¯ + (1− λ)
)
T (a−)
a+f(λ) + ν 1−αα
(
λa+a¯ + (1− λ)
)
T (a+)
(48)
The result of the proposition is obtained if the derivative of this expression with respect
to λ is negative. It is true if and only if:
[f(λ)− λf ′(λ)] [a+ (a−a¯ − 1)T (a−)− a− (a+a¯ − 1)T (a+)] <
f ′(λ)[a+T (a−)− a−T (a+)] + ν 1−αα T (a+)T (a−)
(
a+−a−
a¯
)
The left-hand-side has two components. The second is obviously negative. It is straight-
forward to show that 1 > λf
′(λ)
f(λ) and then that the left hand side is negative.
It only remains to show that the right-hand-side is positive. It is true under the condi-
tion of the proposition.2
Proof of proposition 5 (bis):
The relative wealth inequalities can be written:
Wt(a−)
Wt(a+)
=
A(1− α)kα−1a¯α a−(1− τ) + ν 1−αα
(
λa−a¯ + (1− λ)
)
T (a−)
A(1− α)kα−1a¯α a+(1− τ) + ν 1−αα
(
λa+a¯ + (1− λ)
)
T (a+)
(49)
The derivative of this expression with respect to λ is negative if and only if:
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1−α
α c
[
(α− 1)kα−2 dkdλ − dνdλkα−1
] [
a−T (a+)(λ
a+
a¯ + 1− λ)− a+T (a−)(λa−a¯ + 1− λ)
]
+1−αα ck
α−1 [a+T (a−)(a−a¯ − 1)− a−T (a+)(a+a¯ − 1)]
+ν 1−αα T (a−)T (a+)
(
a−−a+
a¯
)
< 0
with c = A(1− α)1−τa¯α > 0.
The last two terms are strictly negative. Then under the condition dk/dλ < 0, and
knowing that dν/dλ < 0, the sign of the ﬁrst term depends only on the sign of the condition
mentioned in the proposition.2
Appendix E
The covariance can also be written as:
∫
Ωa
(a − a¯)(T (a) − T¯ )f(a)da. But as ∫Ωa(a −
a¯)f(a)da = 0, we can write that:
∫
Ωa
(a−a¯)(T (a)−T¯ )f(a)da = ∫Ωa(a−a¯)(T (a)−X)f(a)da,
with X a constant, whatever the value of X. So it is particulary true for X = T (a¯). Then
we can write that:
∫
Ωa
(a− a¯)(T (a)− T¯ )f(a)da = ∫Ωa(a− a¯)(T (a)−T (a¯))f(a)da. The RHS
is positive as it is an integral on a product of terms with the same sign because T ′(a) > 0.2
Appendix F
In this appendix we try to determine if our qualitative results depend on an initial
condition, on the form taken by T (a) or on values taken by our parameters, notably by
the average replacement rate (ν) or the tax rate (τ). In doing so we extend our results to
other countries than France.
For deﬁned-beneﬁt pension systems
Firstly, let us consider the impact of a decrease in λ in function of its initial value. A
simple numeric exercise, using our calibration, shows that our qualitative results remains
true whatever the initial value of λ and whatever the percentage of change in λ. It implies
that a decrease in λ has always a positive impact on capital per capita and on wealth
of every agent. It also always has a negative impact on wealth inequalities, on the Gini
coeﬃcient and on the utility diﬀerential (dUtil).
Secondly, we do the same exercise but with the new function T (a) = a0.75. The form
of this function implies that the average life expectancy of agents in our model is 80 years
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old, what matches the observed life expectancy in most industrialized countries. We ﬁnd
the same qualitative results. As previously, our results do not depend on the initial value
taken by λ.
Thirdly, we solve our model for diﬀerent values of ν (ν ∈ {0.757, 0.6, 0.4})29. Whatever
the function T (a) which is chosen, our qualitative results are unchanged.
For deﬁned-contribution pension systems
We ﬁnd a monotonous relationship between macroeconomic variables and λ. It implies
that the impact of λ on macroeconomic variables has the same sign as this reported in
Table 1 whatever its initial value.
As in the deﬁned-beneﬁt case, the use of the functional form T (a) = a0.75 has no impact
on our qualitative results. λ still has a monotonous impact on macroeconomic variables.
Finally, we check that our qualitative results remain unchanged for τ ∈ {0.1, 0.23, 0.3}.
Appendix G
In this appendix, we sum up our calibration of the functions and of the parameters of
our model. Furthermore, we detail some important statistics.
The Basic Calibration
The length of each period is 40 years. Table 2 sums up the basic parameters which we
use for the numerical resolution of our model.
The calibration of functions and their main statistics
Firstly, we calibrate the interval Ωa. We use:
Ωa = [0.08, 1]
The ratio a+/a− is lower than the one found in Acemoglu (2002) but higher than the
29ν = 0.4 seems to be the lowest replacement rate in among industrialized countries. See Nyce and
Schieber (2005, pp.236).
26
Parameter Meaning Value Source(s)
α RtKt/Yt
a 0.33 Sommacal (2006) among others
β Actualization factor 0.6 APDR=1.3%b, d'Autume (2003),
Heer and Maussner (2005)
A The technology level 1 Normalization
n Population's growth rate 0.3 AGR=0.65%c, Charpin (1999)
ν Average Replacement rated 0.757 Hairault and Langot (2008)
τ Tax ratee 0.23 Hairault and Langot (2008)
λI Initial value of λ
f 0.885 Hairault and Langot (2008)
aThe share of income spent on capital.
bAnnual psychological discount rate.
cAGR=annual growth rate.
dFor deﬁned-beneﬁt pension systems.
eFor deﬁned-contribution pension systems.
fWe use this value as a reference. We analyse the eﬀects of a decrease in λ knowing that λ is
initially λI .
Table 2: Basic Calibration of the model
one of Piketty (2002). The corresponding density function is:
f(a) = 2.1129− 1.9a (50)
These two components respect the two main properties:
• mode<median<mean, Source: Lambert (2001)
• IGw = 0.3230 in France, Source: Hairault and Langot (2008), INSEE (1999)
In our model, we have:
a¯ = 0.4167
amedian = 0.378
amode = a− = 0.08
V ar(a) = 0.05533
Secondly, we calibrate the function T (a):
T (a) = a
It implies that the distribution of the length of life has the same properties as the distri-
bution of the variable a. Furthermore, we have:
30IGw denotes the Gini coeﬃcient of wages.
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COVT (a),a = V ar(a) = 0.05533
Knowing that the length of each period is 40 years, the average length of life31 is 77
years. It is lower than the ﬁgure for France which is around 80 years32 (Source: INSEE or
World Bank). The standard deviation is:
σT (a) = 0.24
which corresponds to a standard deviation of almost 9.4 years33.
31The life expectancy of each individual is (1 + T (a)) ∗ 40.
32Appendix F shows that it has no impact on our qualitative results.
33The standard deviation for the function T (a) = a0.75 is lower than 9 years.
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Figure 1: Capital per young (kt) for deﬁned-beneﬁt pension systems. Periods are reported
on the abscissa.
Figure 2: Utility of the richest (Ut(a+)) for deﬁned-beneﬁt pension systems. For example
U1(a+) is the utility of the richest born in period 1.
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Figure 3: Utility of the poorest (Ut(a−)) for deﬁned-beneﬁt pension systems. For example
U1(a−) is the utility of the poorest born in period 1.
Figure 4: Utility diﬀerential for deﬁned-beneﬁt pension systems
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Figure 5: Capital per young (kt) for deﬁned-contribution pension systems
Figure 6: Utility of the richest (Ut(a+)) for deﬁned-contribution pension systems
31
Figure 7: Utility of the poorest (Ut(a−)) for deﬁned-contribution pension systems
Figure 8: Utility Diﬀerential for deﬁned-contribution pension systems
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